Brussels broadens defence policy from research towards production and procurement

For years, European defence policy was framed through programmes supporting technological cooperation and industrial development, first with the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and later with the European Defence Fund (EDF). In recent months, that landscape has expanded. The European Commission maintains the EDF as the flagship funding instrument for collaborative R&D projects, but now complements it with new levers to scale up production, coordinate joint procurement, monitor supply chains and address capability gaps ahead of 2030. In parallel, the European Council has linked this shift to an increasingly prominent idea in its political vocabulary: a more sovereign Europe, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act.

The starting point of this trajectory was the EDIDP. Brussels describes it as the first European grant programme aimed at capability development and the co-financing of joint development of defence products and technologies, with a budget of €500 million for 2019 and 2020. Today, its role is no longer that of a frontline instrument but rather that of a precursor. The interim evaluation of the EDF, adopted in June 2025, includes a specific assessment of EDIDP, signalling that the Commission now treats it as an earlier programme from which lessons are drawn for the next phase.

That next phase still centres on the EDF as the main vehicle for funding collaborative R&D projects. The 2026 work programme, adopted on 17 December 2025, allocates €1 billion across 31 topics for defence research and development, with a proposal submission deadline of 29 September. Brussels aims to balance funding between traditional military capabilities, future capabilities and innovation, while also reserving specific space for SMEs and mid-caps through EUDIS.

With an established track record in security, space and defence – sectors that have gained increasing strategic weight within the EU agenda – Zabala Innovation is further strengthening its involvement in this call, supporting its clients throughout the entire process. The consultancy demonstrates a strong performance in the programme, with a 58% success rate, and experience spanning from proposal drafting to project implementation, contributing to key areas such as coordination, management, dissemination and the exploitation of results.

From priorities to delivery capacity

The new official narrative does not stop there. In the White Paper on European Defence – Readiness 2030, presented a year ago and since established as a reference framework, the European Commission and the High Representative set out priorities across seven major capability areas. These include air and missile defence, artillery, ammunition and missiles, drones and counter-drone systems, military mobility, the integration of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, cyber and electronic warfare, as well as so-called strategic enablers and the protection of critical infrastructure. The document goes beyond listing capabilities: it links these gaps to European incentives, demand aggregation and collaborative procurement—in other words, a chain that runs from defining needs to the industrial phase.

This shift was reinforced last month. At its latest meeting on 19 March, the European Council called for more concrete projects in the coming months and urged the European defence industry to increase production, particularly in priority equipment. Heads of State and Government also highlighted the evolution of capability coalitions, the joint development and procurement of drone and counter-drone systems, the protection of the eastern flank, and capabilities in air defence, precision strike and space services. This is no minor nuance. R&D remains in place, but the institutional focus is moving towards execution, manufacturing capacity and speed of delivery.

Defence enters the industrial phase

This is where the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) comes in, which should not be confused with the former EDIDP. Brussels presents it as a €1.5 billion initiative for 2025–2027 aimed at strengthening and modernising the European defence industry, increasing production capacity and ensuring the continuous supply of military equipment. Following the political agreement reached in October 2025 between Parliament and Council, the Commission added elements that go beyond the traditional logic of R&D grants: support for product industrialisation, reinforcement of supply chains, a European security of supply regime, European defence projects of common interest, and a 65% EU-made content requirement for funded projects.

The other key element of this shift is SAFE, the financial instrument adopted by the Council on 27 May 2025 to support joint investments by Member States in defence industrial production and to close critical capability gaps. In practice, SAFE shifts the centre of gravity of the EU debate. It is no longer only about co-financing technological consortia, but about enabling financial scale to procure jointly and sustain an industrial base capable of delivering. The European Commission itself defines it as a tool to accelerate defence readiness through urgent, large-scale investments in support of industry. The mechanism is already operational, following the approval of national plans and the first rounds of financial support.

Strategic autonomy with an industrial focus

The notion of strategic autonomy has accompanied this entire process, but its institutional translation has evolved. The European Council recalls that, since the Versailles Declaration of March 2022, EU leaders agreed to invest more and better in defence, strengthen industry and reduce strategic dependencies. In June 2025, its President, António Costa, summarised this evolution with a formulation that has since reappeared in the debate: a more sovereign Europe, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act in a coordinated manner. In March 2026, this same idea was extended to the economic sphere in the One Europe, One Market agenda, where leaders linked competitiveness, strategic autonomy and economic security, while calling for a proportionate “European preference” in strategic sectors and technologies and a mapping of dependencies in sensitive areas.

EU defence industrial policy is thus structured along a continuum that no longer begins and ends in the laboratory. The industrial strategy presented in March 2024 set targets for 2030 and 2035 that help illustrate this shift. Brussels called on Member States to procure at least 40% of their defence equipment collaboratively by 2030, to increase intra-EU defence trade to at least 35% of the European market, and to move towards spending 50% of defence procurement budgets within the EU by 2030 and 60% by 2035.